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28 FEB 1973

TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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TRENDS

In Communist Propaganda

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28 FEBRUARY 1973
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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 19 - 25 FEBRUARY 1973

<u>Moscow (3030 items)</u>	<u>Peking (1046 items)</u>
Czechoslovak 25th Anniversary [Brezhnev Speeches (--) 6%]	Domestic Issues (52%) 45%
Soviet Armed Forces Day (--) 9%	Laos Peace Accord (--) 16%
Vietnam (15%) 9%	Vietnam (17%) 6%
Laos Peace Accord (--) 4%	Begum Bhutto of Pakistan in PRC
China (4%) 3%	Joint Communique on Kissinger's Visit
Podgorny's 70th Birthday (1%) 3%	Libyan Airliner Downed (--) 2%
Middle East (2%) 3%	
[Libyan Airliner Downed (--) 1%]	

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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INDOCHINA

Coinciding with the opening of the international conference on Vietnam, the PRG and DRV dramatized their concern over alleged allied violations of the peace accord with government statements on 25 and 26 February, respectively--the first protests at this level since the Paris agreement was signed. But communist media have remained silent on the DRV's failure to supply the expected list of the next group of U.S. POW's to be released, as well as on the threat by a DRV spokesman in Saigon on the 27th that further release of U.S. prisoners will depend on strict allied compliance with the cease-fire and implementation of other provisions of the accord. DRV Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh seemed to be alluding to this threat, however, when he said in his speech at the conference session on the 27th that violations of the cease-fire "affect the implementation of the other provisions of the Paris agreement on Vietnam."

No media of the communist participants at Paris have yet acknowledged the White House demand that there be a DRV clarification on prisoner release before other business is conducted at the Paris conference. However, TASS on the 28th reported that DRV Paris spokesman Nguyen Thanh Le had "firmly rejected a groundless statement by the U.S. representative that the DRV's release of U.S. POW's allegedly proceeds slower than the withdrawal of the U.S. troops from Vietnam."

The PRG and DRV government statements recapitulating charges of allied violations of the peace accord during the past month typically focused their sharpest attack on Saigon, but they also again underlined U.S. responsibility. The PRG statement repeated the allegation that the United States had failed to promptly implement the provision for withdrawal and dismantling of foreign bases, and the DRV statement elaborated on earlier charges of delay in clearing mines when it claimed that the United States had tried to evade responsibility for their removal from DRV "waterways."

In keeping with the general paucity of Hanoi references to the international conference, DRV media's attention to the Paris sessions has been confined largely to reportage. The communist stand that the conference should acknowledge the accord and express concern to see its provisions implemented was reinforced in the speeches by the PRG and DRV foreign ministers. Moscow's and Peking's approval of the agreement and their desire to see the Vietnam question eliminated as a source of international tension was reflected in the speeches by Chi Peng-fei and Gromyko.

DRV, PRG SAY U.S. RESPONSIBLE FOR GVN ADHERENCE TO AGREEMENT

The PRG and DRV government statements along with other current propaganda seem calculated to give special impetus to the Vietnamese

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communists' concerted policy of pressuring the United States to insure that Saigon adheres to the provisions of the peace accord. At the same time, a certain circumspection was reflected in the failure of Hanoi and Front media to carry the 27 February statement by the Hanoi spokesman in Saigon which directly linked the return of further U.S. POW's to the implementation of other aspects of the accord. According to Western news agencies, DRV spokesman Bui Tin had said that the release of more American prisoners would require strict application of the cease-fire, the simultaneous return of civilian and military prisoners, and a guarantee of improved working conditions for the Joint Military Commission (JMC). Hanoi and the Front have similarly failed to carry the statement by DRV spokesman in Paris Nguyen Thanh Le on the 28th indicating that the prisoner release will continue after measures have been taken to insure the safety of the communist members of the JMC.

The only current Vietnamese communist propaganda bearing on the release of American prisoners is a VNA English report on the 28th of remarks that day by Maj. Gen. Le Quang Hoa, head of the DRV delegation to the JMC. Leaving the impression that the prisoners will be released, VNA quoted Hoa as observing that the DRV has honored its commitment and completed the first phase of the turnover of American POW's and as adding that it "will carry out the next phase in the same satisfactory manner, according to the agreement." VNA went on to report briefly that he demanded that the United States and Saigon stop their "serious" violations and strictly implement the accord.

DRV Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh's speech at the second session of the international conference in Paris on the 27th did not raise the issue of POW's directly but pointedly noted that unspecified provisions of the agreement might be jeopardized by cease-fire violations. He said:

Empty promises and protestations of good will are unable to conceal the fact that in South Vietnam now the cease-fire is not observed, and the hostilities have not yet ended, thereby affecting the implementation of the other provisions of the Paris agreements on Vietnam.*

* This portion of Trinh's speech was quoted in Liberation Radio's summary of his remarks but not in VNA's summary. The text of Trinh's speech was carried by NCNA, but at this writing Vietnamese communist media are not known to have carried it.

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Trinh made it clear that he held the United States responsible when he went on to charge that the situation demonstrated that "neocolonialist forces outside Vietnam" were continuing a policy of "instigating bellicose forces" in the South to suppress liberties and oppose national reconciliation and concord. He warned that "if this policy is not brought to an end, it will bring about serious consequences to peace in Vietnam, Southeast Asia, and the world," and he added that "in this context," the international conference is "of special importance." The possibility of a danger to peace and the role of the international community in urging the implementation of the accord had been raised in the 26 February DRV Government statement. The statement had warned that if violations of the peace agreement continue, "peace cannot be preserved in a lasting manner in South Vietnam." And both the PRG and DRV government statements had urged that international pressure be brought to bear on the United States and Saigon, calling for the governments and people of the world to demand that the U.S. and Saigon governments respect and implement the peace agreement.

U.S. responsibility for alleged GVN violations of the accord was stressed in some Hanoi comment on the 27th. Thus a NHAN DAN editorial that day, discussing the 25 February PRG statement, maintained that GVN violations could not occur without "U.S. connivance and condonation." The paper charged that the United States and the Saigon administration "do not respect their signatures" and are scheming to "pursue the 'Vietnamization' policy in the new situation to impose U.S. imperialist neocolonialism on South Vietnam and perpetuate the partition of Vietnam." Even stronger language was used in a Hanoi radio commentary on the 27th which argued at length that the United States has the main responsibility for the implementation of the peace accord. The commentary warned that Washington and Saigon must "clearly understand" that communist "patience" does not mean "folding our arms and allowing the adversary to do what he wants." It concluded:

Because we do not want to see U.S. honor buried again in the Vietnam problem, we advance serious demands to the U.S. side: that it strictly discharge its responsibility under the agreement and compel the Saigon administration to scrupulously and strictly implement provisions of the agreement and protocols.

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CHARGES OF U.S.
VIOLATIONS

Both the PRG and the DRV Government statements repeated charges against the United States which had been introduced in front and Hanoi propaganda some 10 days ago.* The PRG statement accused the United States of failing to supply a complete plan of troop withdrawal and attempting to avoid dismantling its bases. It described the U.S. attitude as one of deliberate procrastination and evasion and charged that Washington "has not yet renounced its policy of 'Vietnamization of the war.'" The DRV statement echoed earlier Hanoi comment, beginning with the 15 February NHAN DAN editorial, in charging that the United States has deliberately delayed the removal of mines in the DRV's territorial waters, ports, and waterways. It added the new claim that the United States has also "sought to evade its responsibility in the removal of mines on the waterways," although such removal is "clearly stipulated" in the protocol on mine clearance. The DRV statement also denounced U.S. air strikes in Laos and Cambodia.

GOVERNMENT STATEMENTS CITE ALLEGED GVN VIOLATIONS OF ACCORD

Setting forth an indictment of Saigon's actions over the past month, the PRG and DRV government statements repeated charges in earlier protests that the GVN has continued military operations, repressed the citizenry, refused to return civilian prisoners, and hampered the activities of the Joint Military Commission and International Commission for Control and Supervision (ICCS). The PRG statement seemed to reflect some concern that Saigon military moves were having some success; it complained that "the Saigon army has penetrated deep into the areas under the control of the PRG and illegally set up many more posts and positions."

Like other propaganda, the PRG statement particularly decried alleged attacks on areas designated as the sites to receive military delegations, for the return of prisoners, or as points of entry for the replacement of armaments. A 28 February PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement protested a particularly serious incident of this nature which had allegedly occurred on the 25th. According to the spokesman, the guards of a PRG delegation to the JMC were ambushed by Saigon troops as they approached a designated reception spot in the Nam Ban area, Tuyen Dic Province. The statement claims that four of the PRG personnel were killed and two wounded.

* See the TRENDS of 22 February 1973, pages 1-3.

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The DRV statement complained at length about Saigon's treatment of the communist delegations to the JMC, citing as an example the 25 February attacks by demonstrators on the DRV delegation's headquarters in Hue and Da Nang. Hanoi propaganda has continued to call attention to these incidents, among other things reporting on the arrival in the North Vietnamese capital of members of the DRV delegation to the JMC injured in the attacks, and noting that they were visited in the hospital by Defense Minister Giap. On 28 February VNA reported that the head of the DRV delegation to the JMC, Maj. Gen. Le Quang Hoa, had announced the DRV's intention to temporarily withdraw its delegations from the regional commissions in Hue and Da Nang because their security and activities had not been guaranteed.

CIVILIAN PRISONERS While Hanoi and Front media ignored the reported 27 February statement by DRV spokesman Bui Tin linking the release of U.S. POW's with the release of Vietnamese civilian and military prisoners, comment has been scoring Saigon for allegedly refusing to release political prisoners. The questions of the return of civilian and military prisoners were, however, lumped together in a general way in a Hanoi radio account of the statement by PRG delegate Tran Van Tra at the 26 February session of the JMC. According to the radio, Tra included among proposals to the United States and Saigon a call for the parties to "insure the total release of all the military and civilian personnel being detained by the various parties."

The charge that Saigon is attempting to delay the return of political prisoners and to "hide a major part of them" was made in a VNA report on the first session of the two-party South Vietnamese joint military subcommission on civilian prisoners. VNA indicated that the PRG representative at the 23 February session had rejected the Saigon representative's claim that the GVN has only 5,081 civilians to be returned. VNA said that arguments by the PRG side forced the Saigon representatives to "admit" that the figure on prisoners "is not unchangeable" and that they promised to consult their "superiors and to settle the matter." Also on the 23d, the PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman issued a statement scoring GVN policies toward both civilian and military prisoners. The spokesman denied Saigon charges that the communists are detaining thousands of unaccounted-for civilians. On 28 February LPA began publicizing a "white book" on the Saigon administration's policies toward prisoners.

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COMMUNIST MEDIA TAKE LOW-KEY APPROACH TO PARIS CONFERENCE

HANOI While there has been no Hanoi comment on the Paris conference, the DRV's stand on various issues was initially made clear in VNA's account of the first plenary session on 26 February. After noting that there would be a second plenary session on the 27th, meetings of a subcommission on documents on 28 February and 1 March, and the signing of a convention on 2 March, VNA briefly reported some of the substance of the six opening speeches. The account observed, for example, that the Canadian delegate "wanted to change the basic principles" on the ICCS, in contravention of the peace accord and protocols. VNA did not explain, however, that the Canadians have called for a continuing international organization to which the ICCS can report.

VNA was similarly critical of Secretary Rogers when it observed that he "tried to evade the responsibility of the United States and the Saigon administration for the serious violations of the cease-fire provisions." The account also criticized the Secretary for "failing to touch upon the fundamental national rights of the Vietnamese--namely, independence, unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity . . ." (VNA pointed up this omission further by saying that French Foreign Minister Schumann particularly noted that Article 1 of the peace accord affirms that the United States and other countries respect the independence, unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Vietnam.) VNA complained further that Rogers "intentionally misinterpreted Articles 19 and 20 with a view to covering up the U.S. violation of the cease-fire in Laos" and that he "refused" to make any commitment to end the U.S. "aggression" against Cambodia and tried "to create conditions for the conference to interfere in the internal affairs of Cambodia."

DRV Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh, in his speech to the conference on the 27th, indicated that Hanoi considers the "main responsibility of the conference" to be to contribute to "ensuring strict respect and scrupulous implementation of the agreement." He proposed that the conference agree on a convention which would 1) acknowledge the peace agreement; 2) pledge the participating governments to respect the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Vietnam and to observe the peace accord; and 3) call on other countries to do the same. Trinh also called for the convention to stipulate "measures to be taken in case of violations jeopardizing the peace, independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Vietnam and the South Vietnamese

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people's right of self-determination." He suggested that there was no disagreement with the United States on these measures, since he did not mention them in a subsequent list of major points still at issue between Hanoi and Washington.

Trinh began his list of U.S.-DRV differences by noting that "the greatest difficulty now lies in the fact that a number of circles do not want to recognize the existence of the PRG." Without specifying the implications of this problem for the conference, he went on to argue that the PRG is the "genuine representative of the South Vietnamese people" and to state that the PRG has committed itself to work with other political forces for a political solution; he added that "the other parties in South Vietnam must do the same."

Trinh indicated that Hanoi did not want the conference to deal with the questions of Laos or Cambodia. This position had not been spelled out before, but DRV Premier Pham Van Dong had suggested this view in his 20 February speech to the DRV National Assembly when he stressed that the international conference was to deal with Vietnam. The DRV foreign minister also stated that the conference should not discuss the question of postwar reconstruction in Vietnam. In this context he stated--for the first time in Vietnamese communist media--the DRV position that such assistance "must be carried out on the basis of consultation and agreement between each government and the DRV Government." He did note that Hanoi welcomes assistance extended by all countries, irrespective of their political systems.

PEKING PRC coverage of the start of the international conference on Vietnam and remarks of Chinese delegation leader Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei have reflected Peking's desire to see the outside powers undertake to respect the accord and thus to eliminate the Vietnam question as a source of international tension. Peking's first comment on the conference came in Chi's brief statement on arrival in Paris on 25 February which reaffirmed PRC support for the Vietnam agreement, backed the international conference as a means to contribute to implementation of the agreement, and expressed Chinese readiness to cooperate with all concerned parties to insure the success of the conference.

Chi's speech at the first plenary session on the 26th also registered Peking's relief over the Vietnam settlement and its interest in fostering an amicable atmosphere conducive to an

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easing of tension in Southeast Asia. He called the Paris agreement "a great achievement," taking a neutral stance in observing that the "parties to the agreement contributed their share to its conclusion." Chi gave a carefully restricted interpretation of the role to be played by the international conference, stressing that responsibility for implementing the peace agreement lies with the four signatories. He added that the other countries participating in the conference should make their contribution by undertaking to respect the "independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity" of Vietnam and the right of the South Vietnamese to self-determination, and by not interfering in any form in internal Vietnamese affairs. He put the PRC on record as endorsing this course of action.

While finding it "heartening" that "some" provisions of the accord are being implemented, Chi cautioned that implementation is still in its initial stage and complained that unnamed "certain people" had made statements detrimental to realization of the agreement and that violations concerning the cease-fire, prisoner release, and functioning of the JMC have occurred. He hoped that this state of affairs "will be promptly checked," but he avoided laying blame on particular parties. Peking has not directly accused the United States or Saigon of violating the Vietnam accord since the 15 February PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article seconding earlier DRV and PRG protests. Subsequent PRC coverage of Vietnamese communist pronouncements, including the 25 February PRG and 26 February DRV government statements, has sanitized harsh passages pointing the finger of blame at the United States for recent transgressions.

NCNA has reported Chi's meetings with the DRV, PRG, French, American, British, and UN delegations, carried general accounts of the two plenary sessions held thus far, and promptly replayed the full texts of PRG Foreign Minister Binh's 26 February speech and the address on the 27th by DRV Foreign Minister Trinh. NCNA did not indicate the atmosphere in noting that Chi "had a meeting" with Secretary Rogers on 25 February, but it pointed to the significance of the meeting for Sino-American relations in noting that they "had tea together and exchanged views on the questions of claims and assets between China and the United States."

MOSCOW Moscow media have duly reported ongoing events surrounding the Paris conference, including the arrival of delegates and their various meetings. Among other things, TASS reported that PRG Foreign Minister Mme. Binh had indicated that the conference

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should adopt a "general document" which would include support for the Paris agreement and protocols as well as an appeal to nonparticipating countries to facilitate implementation of the peace accord.

The TASS account of the six speeches at the initial session on the 26th focused on Mme. Binh's speech; TASS briefly noted some of the remarks of all the other speakers except those of Secretary Rogers, about which it said only that he "set out his government's point of view concerning the work of the international conference on Vietnam and questions of its agenda."

Further indication of the proceedings appeared in Moscow's report of the post-session press briefings which quoted DRV spokesman Nguyen Thanh Le as saying that an editorial committee had been set up to draft a "concluding document." Moscow also noted Le's observation that the DRV supports neither Canada's proposal that a permanent organ of the conference be set up nor the U.S. suggestion that discussions of Laos and Cambodia be included on the conference agenda. Moscow noted that PRG spokesman Le Van Sau released the 25 February PRG statement on alleged violations of the peace accord. (TASS subsequently reported the DRV Government statement on the 26th, including Hanoi's charge of a U.S. delay in clearing the mines. Other attention to violations of the peace accord included PRAVDA's quoting of DRV Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh's observation on arrival that there have been numerous violations, "some of which have been extremely serious." TASS also reported that six DRV members of the JMC wounded during South Vietnamese demonstrations had been flown to Hanoi.)

Moscow's attention to the second plenary session of the conference was highlighted by the account of Foreign Minister Gromyko's speech. In the vein of Brezhnev's 30 January speech during Le Duc Tho's stop-over in Moscow, Gromyko hailed the Vietnam agreement as paving the way for a further relaxation of international tension and for security in Asia. He also echoed Brezhnev regarding the importance of past Soviet aid. And he went on to endorse the DRV position when he said that while postwar aid should be forthcoming from states regardless of their social order, such assistance should be rendered on a bilateral basis. He also observed that the peace agreement must logically lead to the establishment and maintenance of DRV-U.S. relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence. (Moscow commentators' discussion of the Vietnam peace agreement as paving the way for an Asian collective security system has continued, with the most notable recent propaganda being a series of radio commentaries by Itskov for Japanese listeners from 20 to 22 February. Like other recent propaganda, Itskov accused Peking of hindering normalization of the Asian situation by its "anti-Soviet policies.")

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LAO SIDES CHARGE CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS; PLJC WELCOMES ACCORD

With the signing of the Laos cease-fire agreement which went into effect on 22 February, the Vientiane and Pathet Lao sides promptly began trading charges of violations. At the same time, however, the 20th session of the Vientiane talks was held as scheduled on the 27th. According to a post-session statement by a spokesman for the Vientiane delegation, reported by the Vientiane domestic service on the 27th, each side protested the other's cease-fire violations but the protests were "polite" and the session was held in a "good atmosphere." The spokesman reported that the sides also discussed the formation of political and military subcommittees which had been discussed in earlier private talks. The session was held at the deputy level because Phoumi Vongvichit, NLHS secretary general who had been serving as "special adviser" to the NLHS delegation and Phoune Siprasaith, head of the NLHS delegation, left Vientiane on 24 February for Sam Neua via Hanoi.

On 23 February Souvanna Phouma gave a press conference in which he accused North Vietnamese forces of violating the agreement "even before the ink was dry," launching a "general offensive" throughout Laos. He said that the most serious incident involved the sending of "a large number of forces" to capture Pak Song, and he announced that he had requested air protection from the United States.

On the 24th an NLHS Central Committee spokesman's statement denounced Vientiane for violating the cease-fire agreement and took issue with Souvanna Phouma's charges against the "various patriotic forces" and his request to the United States to continue bombing. Echoing Souvanna Phouma's phrase, the NLHS statement charged that the Vientiane government began to violate the agreement when "the ink was not yet dry." On the 22d, it claimed, Vientiane officers met to plan attacks on the liberated areas, and the Vientiane side failed to order its armed forces to observe the cease-fire. The NLHS statement denounced attacks made by the Vientiane side against the liberated zone and the U.S. B-52 bombings on the 23d against Pak Song as "severe violations" of the agreement, scoring Souvanna Phouma as a "spokesman for the warmonger's clique." Without elaboration, it denied all Souvanna Phouma's "groundless accusations" and asserted that the NLHS and Patriotic Neutralist Forces would strictly implement the agreement but would at the same time "be prepared to fight resolutely" to defend the liberated zone and "smash all military adventures on the ground and in the air of the opposite side."

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Hanoi supported the NLHS with a 26 February DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement which followed initial radio reports that the United States had bombed in Laos with B-52's at the request of Souvanna Phouma in violation of the cease-fire agreement. The DRV statement, supporting the 24 February NLHS statement, denounced Vientiane's continuing "nibbling operations" against liberated areas in Laos as well as the U.S. bombings. It scored as a "pretext" Souvanna Phouma's "slanderous charges" against the Lao patriotic forces and the DRV, but did not elaborate on the nature of his charges. The DRV statement was echoed as usual by a PRG statement, reported by Liberation Radio on the 27th.

Moscow's TASS on 23 and 24 February carried brief, factual reports confirming that the United States had resumed "limited" bombing of Laos and Cambodia, and on the 25th TASS summarized the NLHS Central Committee spokesman's statement, but Moscow has offered no comment of its own on cease-fire violations.

Peking's NCNA duly reported the 24 February NLHS statement and the DRV statement of the 26th but otherwise has not alluded to the issue of cease-fire violations.

REACTION TO ACCORD Leaders of the various communist countries sent congratulatory messages to Lao leaders welcoming the 21 February signing of the Lao cease-fire agreement. The leaders of the PRC, USSR, DRV, and PRG all congratulated Souphanouvong, and all but the PRG also greeted the Lao King. The DRV and PRG also chose to send messages to Khamsouk Keola, the leader of the Patriotic Neutralist Forces (PNF), whereas the other countries failed to mention the role of the PNF in the Lao struggle. Only the PRC also sent a greetings message to Souvanna Phouma. Although the Soviet ambassador, and PRC and DRV envoys among other diplomats, reportedly called on NLHS Secretary General Phoumi Vongvichit in Vientiane to convey their congratulations, there was no report that the diplomats called on Souvanna Phouma. In followup comment in communist media, Souvanna Phouma was likewise virtually ignored.

Brezhnev, Podgornyy, and Kosygin sent a message to Souphanouvong, but the message to the Lao King was sent in Podgornyy's name only. The messages did not name the United States or refer to Thailand's role in the Lao fighting, the message to Souphanouvong asserting that "the imperialist and other reactionary forces" were compelled to settle the Laotian issue. The message to the King, alluding to the Soviet role as a Geneva cochairman, recalled Soviet efforts to end "foreign" armed interference including bombings. The Soviet

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messages explicitly referred to the 1962 Geneva agreement--unlike the messages from the other communist leaders--maintaining that the new agreement was based on the 1962 accords and paves the way for the realization of the goals envisaged in the accords. The telegram to Souphanouvong pointed out that "the end of the war in Vietnam and Laos creates favorable prospects for the further struggle by progressive forces for peace and security in Asia," an apparent allusion to the Soviet campaign to win support for an Asian collective security system.

Unlike the leaders' messages, some routine level Soviet comment took the United States to task by name for its role in Laos. A 21 February TASS commentary, for example, warned that the agreement would be "just a sheet of paper" if the United States, "the main belligerent party in Laos," refused to honor it.

Recalling the Soviet Union's role as cochairman of the 1962 Geneva conference, IZVESTIYA on the 22d asserted that the "international authority" of the USSR in that capacity promoted the establishment of peace in Laos. PRAVDA correspondent Skvortsov reported in a 21 February dispatch from Vientiane that NLHS Secretary General Phoumi Vongvichit had told him that "the USSR and the other socialist states" had played an important role in "achieving peace and a just political settlement." Skvortsov added that "complicated work" remained because of the "possible complications connected with those feelings of mistrust which have built up during the long war years."

Acting PRC Chairman Tung Pi-wu's message to the Laotian King and Chou's message to Souvanna Phouma were very brief, extending congratulations and wishing successes to the Laotian people. The message to the King also expressed hope for the continued development of Sino-Laotian friendship. Chou's message to Souphanouvong added that the Laotian agreement marked "the advent of a new stage in the struggle of the Lao people" and promised the continuation of "firm support to the just cause of the fraternal peoples of Laos and the other Indochinese countries" by the Chinese people.

In line with Peking's general reluctance to attack the United States by name, NCNA's report of the DRV message to Souphanouvong omitted a passage on "the failure of the aggressive and reactionary forces led by the United States, an unprecedented failure of the 'special war' strategy and the policy of 'Laotianization'." NCNA did, however, include the reference to "the barbarous aggression of the U.S. imperialist" in reporting the NFLSV-PRG message to Souphanouvong.

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NCNA transmitted a PEOPLE's DAILY 23 February editorial on the Vientiane agreement, the only Chinese comment monitored thus far. The editorial viewed the agreement as "a tremendous victory for the Lao people and the patriotic forces of Laos" and "a common victory for the three Indochinese peoples and the people of the whole world." It said the United States "trampled on and undermined" the 1962 Geneva accords, "instigated the Lao rightist forces to stage a coup d'etat, subverted the Lao Government of National Union, provoked a civil war in Laos and went as far as to send its own troops to invade the country." The editorial added that the Vientiane agreement "clearly stipulates that the United States must scrupulously carry out and observe the 1962 Geneva agreement" by withdrawing its military personnel and ending "military activities of all kinds."

The message sent by North Vietnamese President Ton Duc Thang and Premier Pham Van Dong to Souphanouvong stressed the U.S. role and the involvement of "the Thai clique of henchmen" in the Laotian fighting, points not mentioned in the messages of other communist leaders. The message hailed the close relations between the Vietnamese and Lao people and emphasized that with the support of "the socialist countries and the progressive people" any small country could forestall defeat by "any imperialist forces." Ton Duc Thang's brief message to the Laotian King blandly said the agreement was "the fruit of a long, hard and extremely heroic struggle of the Lao people." His message to Keola paid tribute to the alliance of the NLHS and the Laotian Patriotic Neutralist Forces.

The joint messages sent by NFLSV Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho and PRG President Huynh Tan Phat to Souphanouvong and Keola were similar to the North Vietnamese messages, but they sharpened North Vietnamese accusations of U.S. aggression in Laos by characterizing this aggression as "brutal" and "barbarous," unlike the Soviet and Chinese messages, the North Vietnamese and NFLSV-PRG messages identified the United States as an aggressor in Laos.

Phoumi Vongvichit was feted by Pham Van Dong and Le Duc Tho during a 24-26 February stop-over in Hanoi on his way back from Vientiane to Sam Neua after signing the agreement. The DRV leaders reiterated their praise for the Laos accord in speeches at a rally and banquet.

Hanoi's initial comment on the agreement consisted of a domestic service broadcast of a 22 February NHAN DAN editorial calling the signing of the agreement a "great victory" for the Lao people

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in their struggle against "reactionary elements" headed by the "U.S. imperialists" and including their satellite Thailand. The editorial acknowledged that the agreement had been signed by a representative of the Vientiane government but noted that the Souvanna Phouma administration was given a "neutral" label by the United States "to protect the extremist, reactionary, and lackey forces" working in it. The editorial maintained that the "genuine" neutralists supported the positions of the NLHS. The editorial asserted that under the new agreement "the U.S.-Vientiane side was forced to recognize" the "liberated areas" in which the Laotian revolution would "develop its influence" and affect "the future development of the entire country." A QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial the same day, also broadcast by Hanoi domestic service, added that the agreement confirmed "the bankruptcy of the Nixon Doctrine on Lao soil." The editorial praised the Laotian people's struggle against "the U.S. imperialist aggressors--the most cruel enemy of progressive mankind."

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MIDDLE EAST

LOW-KEY SOVIET COMMENT ON PLANE DOWNING CITES CAIRO PEACE MOVE

Continuing Soviet comment on the 21 February downing of a Libyan civil aircraft in Sinai, as well as on the Israeli raid the same day against Palestinian camps in northern Lebanon, has seemed calculated to urge restraint on the Arab states at a time when Cairo is mounting a "new initiative" for a Middle East settlement.* In keeping with their general restraint, Soviet media waited until the 26th to report condolences sent by Podgornyy to Egypt's as-Sadat and Libya's al-Qadhafi; and the low-keyed message was confined to an expression of sympathy over the tragic deaths of Egyptian and Libyan citizens who "became victims of another provocation by Israeli aggressors."

Concern over the Arab response seemed indicated in an observation in a PRAVDA dispatch on the 24th that the action against the Libyan aircraft was "intended to provoke military operations" at a time when Egypt "is launching a new initiative for a political settlement." Perhaps significantly, the co-author of this Cairo-dated dispatch was Igor Belyayev, former PRAVDA Middle East specialist, who was last known to have been in Cairo late last July following as-Sadat's expulsion of the Soviet military advisors. Then and now, his presence in Egypt was revealed by the publication of signed dispatches from Cairo. And PRAVDA on 15 February carried a Beirut-dated dispatch article which indicated that the paper's other former Middle East expert, Yevgeniy Primakov, also was again in the area. (Belyayev and Primakov are both now deputy directors of institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences.) In the first of their reports from Cairo, on the 23d, PRAVDA "special correspondents" Belyayev and Glukhov had also linked Israel's "fresh provocations" with the start of "diplomatic contacts and a quest for a settlement of the Middle East crisis being undertaken by Cairo."

Soviet propaganda has branded the Israeli action criminal, barbaric, and hideous, charged that the airliner was shot down "deliberately and in cold blood," and derided Israel for

* Moscow all but ignored the talks held in Washington on 23 February by President as-Sadat's national security adviser, Hafiz Isma'il, although it has approvingly referred to Egypt's "wide diplomatic campaign" concerning ways of solving the Middle East conflict.

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hypocritical and insincere condolences to the victims' relatives and for contradictory reports and "justifications" of the downing. But this incident, unlike some other Israeli "armed provocations" in the past, failed to evoke any authoritative Soviet statement.* In the weekly commentators' roundtable program broadcast in Moscow's domestic service on the 25th, moderator Zorin brushed off the "unprecedented attack" on the aircraft in introductory remarks summing up the week's events. He attributed to the London DAILY TELEGRAPH the conclusion that Israel's actions "are somehow linked to the start of new attempts to achieve peace in the Middle East."

The USSR Trade Union of Aviation Workers did not express its "profound indignation" until the 26th, when TASS reported messages of "resolute protest" sent to the counterpart Arab organization in Cairo and to the International Federation of Airline Pilots' Associations in London. There have been no other reported protests from Soviet organizations, and expressions of Soviet citizens' "indignation" have been monitored only in broadcasts in Arabic on the 22d and 23d. TASS has reported wide central press attention, but press coverage has focused largely on reaction in the Arab world and in Western Europe.

Only in isolated instances have Moscow commentators drawn any connection between Tel Aviv's action and Washington's support and aid for Israel. The initial commentary on the plane incident, by TASS commentator Kornilov on the 22d, said it was no accident that Israel's "impudent and wicked acts of aggression" occurred while talks were concluding in Washington on new U.S. aid to Israel. Kornilov added the standard charge that Washington's military, economic, and political support serves as encouragement to Tel Aviv's "expansionist policy" and incites "new crimes." Similarly, a Rassadin commentary broadcast in Arabic on the 22d found it striking that the plane downing came shortly before Israeli Prime Minister Meir's trip to Washington, where she reportedly would press for further financial aid to purchase more military aircraft.

* The last such statement, a Soviet Government statement on 17 September last year, condemned Israeli intrusions into Lebanon and Syria. Earlier, TASS statements had been issued following Israeli bombing of an Egyptian metalworks in February 1970 and "provocations" against Lebanon in May of that year.

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EAST EUROPE
REACTIONS

Along the lines of Soviet propaganda, East European comment has pointed out that the Libyan plane downing took place at a time when renewed efforts for a political settlement of the Middle East conflict were anticipated. Like Moscow, the East European commentators accused Israel of trying to thwart efforts for such a settlement. But several of the East European countries reacted more promptly and at more authoritative levels than the USSR did, and several--in contrast to the great bulk of Moscow comment--sought to implicate the United States by virtue of its aid to Israel.

The GDR denounced Israel's action in a 22 February foreign ministry spokesman's statement which claimed that Israeli "extremists" were encouraged by the United States to continue their "antipeace policy" and cited as evidence the grant of a further 500 million dollars in financial aid to Israel. In a similar vein, a Budapest domestic service commentary on the 22d said that while official U.S. statements sought to isolate Washington from the Middle East events, the credibility of these statements was "badly undermined" by the United States' contribution of the lion's share to the maintenance of "aggressive" Israeli policy. Poland's DZIENNIK LUDOWY asserted that not even the Black September, "a small organization composed of expelled and desperate people," had dared execute such a "criminal act."

Romania, which alone of the communist countries maintained relations with Israel after the 1967 war, summoned the Israeli charge d'affaires on the 23d to express government disapproval of an act "contrary to international rules and all humanitarian principles" and conducive to new tensions, with attendant effects on efforts for a political settlement. Also on the 23d, Ceausescu expressed sympathy and "disapproval" of the Israeli action in telegrams to al-Qadhdhafi and as-Sadat. Jerusalem radio reported on the 25th that the Romanian deputy health minister, scheduled to arrive in Israel that morning, had postponed his visit at the last minute, although an Israeli health ministry spokesman said "no political significance" should be attached to the postponement since the visit had already been deferred several times "because of problems of coordination and planning."

Tito sent a telegram of sympathy to al-Qadhdhafi on the 22d condemning the "unprovoked act of piracy on the part of Israel," and the Yugoslav foreign affairs secretariat spokesman the same day expressed Belgrade's condemnation of this "flagrant violation

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of all standards of international law." TANJUG reported from Washington that official U.S. expressions of regret and condolences failed to include a single mention or blame of the perpetrators.

Typically, the Albanian ZERI I POPULLIT, in a 24 February article, charged that Israel's "aggressive policy" was encouraged by both "U.S. imperialism" and "the double-faced stand of the Soviet revisionists"--the former giving Israel political, economic, and military aid while the latter supplied it with "live forces" by allowing the emigration of thousands of Jews to Israel.

PRC COMMENT Peking's reaction to the plane downing was highlighted by a 25 February PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article denouncing the "barbarous attack on an unarmed passenger plane" which resulted in the loss of more than a hundred lives. Commentator cited other recent provocations by the "Zionists supported by imperialism" as demonstrating that the "Israeli aggressors" were trying to seize permanently their "aggressive gains through all kinds of provocations, blackmail, and threats." PEOPLE'S DAILY expressed the Chinese people's "resolute condemnation" of the "brutal act" and their "stauch support" for the Palestinian and other Arab peoples in their just struggle against aggression.

EGYPTIAN WAR MINISTER'S MOSCOW VISIT HAS "SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE"

Egyptian War Minister Ahmad Isma'il 'Ali arrived in Moscow on 26 February on what TASS described as an "official visit"--the first visit by an Egyptian war minister to the USSR since Sadiq, then occupying the post, paid an "official friendly visit" last June.* Brezhnev received Isma'il 'Ali on the 27th, as he had received Sadiq last summer, for a "warm and friendly talk" on matters of mutual interest. The last Soviet-Egyptian military talks in Moscow--the first since the July expulsion of Soviet military advisers from Egypt--had been held by Air Force Commander Mubarak and his delegation last November. The Isma'il 'Ali talks follow the visit to Cairo of a Soviet military delegation which arrived there on 1 February.

* The Sadiq visit is discussed in the TRENDS of 21 June 1972, pages 25-26.

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Explaining the visit as falling within the framework of regular Soviet-Egyptian consultations, a Moscow broadcast in Arabic on the 27th put these talks in the context of the "growing armed provocations" by Israel, citing the 21 February raid into Lebanon and the downing of the Libyan airliner. The visit thus "acquired special importance and significance," the broadcast said. Moscow again urged the Arabs to strengthen their own unity and emphasized the importance of Arab-Soviet friendship and cooperation. The commentary recalled that, as pointed out in the communique on the recent Moscow visit of Egyptian national security adviser Hafiz Isma'il, the USSR stressed that the Arab countries "had full right to use every means of struggle" to liberate their territories.

The 27 February broadcast seemed to place somewhat more emphasis on Soviet military assistance than did a followup commentary on the Sadiq visit last June. At that time, Moscow routinely pledged assistance, including military aid, to peoples struggling for their legitimate rights. The current broadcast called the Isma'il 'Ali visit a further contribution to the cementing of Soviet-Egyptian cooperation, "which includes Soviet aid in strengthening the Egyptian military capability on the grounds that this aid is the most constituent part of this cooperation."

MOSCOW SEES MEIR AS SEEKING MORE ARMS, PARTIAL SETTLEMENT

Limited Soviet comment on Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir's Washington visit, which began on the 26th, has focused on further U.S. aid to Israel and, like other recent Moscow propaganda, has underscored talks being held on an American loan of some 500 million dollars for further military acquisitions. Soviet commentators have also noted that Mrs. Meir herself said the incident of the downing of the Libyan plane would not affect the results of her Washington talks. A Moscow domestic service commentary on the 27th quoted the London TIMES' Washington correspondent as remarking that U.S. reaction to this event was surprisingly mild and as concluding that Washington's unwillingness to criticize Israel evidently stems from its role as chief supplier of arms and its diplomatic support for Israel.

Some propagandists also suggested that plans for a partial settlement in the Middle East would be discussed during the visit. In line with the customary Soviet approach to this idea, the commentators disparaged the concept without flatly rejecting it and displayed Moscow's reluctance to see a made-in-the-U.S. settlement.

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A Sultan foreign-language commentary on the 27th, for example, claimed that the United States was attempting to take on the role of "exclusive broker" in the Middle East but that the "so-called U.S. initiative" amounted at best to an effort to achieve a "so-called partial settlement."

Former PRAVDA Middle East specialist Primakov, in a Beirut-dated article in the 15 February issue, found it unsurprising that Israeli Defense Minister Dayan considered Washington "the most acceptable mediator" of a Mideast peace settlement in light of Tel Aviv's desire for a "so-called intermediate settlement" based on a conditional opening of the Suez Canal: Egypt would not be allowed to transfer troops to the eastern bank, and Israel would make no commitment to withdraw its forces from the other occupied Arab lands.

Moscow has recalled that early in 1971 Egyptian President as-Sadat himself had suggested the idea of an interim settlement based on Israeli withdrawal into Sinai and the opening of the canal as a first stage of an overall settlement. In a 22 February PRAVDA article Demchenko, like Primakov, noted Egyptian opposition to a partial settlement and objected that the fate of the remaining occupied territories would remain "frozen" indefinitely. In a PRAVDA article a month earlier, on 20 January, Demchenko had recalled as-Sadat's proposal but said it was now a "different matter," since Israeli media indicated that the question of the other lands would be frozen. And an article by Petrov in NOVOYE VREMENYA (No. 6, 9 February) also brought up as-Sadat's "idea of an interim settlement"--but failed to point out Egypt's present opposition to a partial settlement and its insistence on an overall settlement.

Demchenko counseled, in his 22 February article, that only determination to defend one's interests and rights, "based on a consideration of the real political and economic factors and the alignment of forces in the international arena," would make Israel heed Arab demands. Calling Resolution 242 the basis of a settlement, Demchenko conceded that its implementation would not be a "simple task" and that by virtue of "established historical conditions it cannot be solved right away." But the Vietnam example, he concluded, demonstrates the possibility of finding peaceful solutions for other conflict situations.

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U. S. - U S S R

MOSCOW APPEARS CAUTIOUS ON RELATIONS WITH U.S., EYES TRADE

Moscow has been cautious in recent public appraisals of the future of U.S.-Soviet relations. Trade relations have emerged as the most pressing question after satisfactory resolution of the Vietnam war and an initial limitation on strategic arms. Moscow's increasing restiveness over the pace of improvement in this area has culminated in a spate of recent comment including articles by PRAVDA commentators Yuriy Zhukov and Viktor Mayevskiy and IZVESTIYA commentator Vladimir Osipov. But the USSR's satisfaction with the overall results of the past year was apparent in the media's commemoration of the 55th anniversary of the Soviet army and navy on 23 February in which U.S.-Soviet conflict was notably softpedaled.

Direct comment on the impact of the Vietnam cease-fire on U.S.-Soviet relations has been limited to reiteration of Brezhnev's 30 January remark at a Kremlin dinner in honor of Le Duc Tho and Nguyen Duy Trinh that "the settlement in Vietnam will have a positive effect on the relations among states that were involved in one way or another," with the added assurance that this applies to U.S.-Soviet relations. USSR media have not reported Brezhnev's letter to President Nixon which, according to Western reports, echoed the 30 January remarks.

By playing down the fissures in U.S.-Soviet relations, particularly on the issue of congressional opposition to the trade agreement embodied in the Jackson resolution, the media have sought to avoid an open confrontation and to convey a message of Moscow's readiness to embark on a new, more mutually advantageous relationship with Washington.

U.S.-SOVIET TRADE

The Zhukov, Mayevskiy, and Osipov articles appeared amid increasing signs that Moscow views difficulties in the path of expanded trade and economic cooperation as the most important obstacle to a further normalization of U.S.-Soviet relations. While further improvement in relations has not been made explicitly conditional on expanded economic cooperation, editor-in-chief of USA magazine Valentin Berezhkov--in a Moscow radio broadcast to North America on 31 December--and others cited Brezhnev's remarks at the USSR 50th Anniversary celebrations last December to indicate that movement in this area could "help to improve the political climate in Soviet-American relations."

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Comment following the July and October sessions of the joint trade commission characterized the meetings as "businesslike" and "fruitful" and labeled the agreements reached in October as an important milestone. However, recent commentaries have taken note of the rough sailing that lies in the path of congressional ratification, and particularly the granting of most-favored-nation (MFN) status to the USSR. The comment has generally rejected as "blackmail" the attempts of opponents to link the relaxation of trade restrictions with issues that have "nothing to do" with trade. That the new emigration tax is at issue was intimated only in a 14 February LITERARY GAZETTE article by that paper's editor-in-chief Aleksandr Chakovskiy. A 19 February commentary by Igor Gayevskiy broadcast to North America accused Senator Jackson and Congressman Mills of "downright interference" in Soviet internal affairs and claimed that their actions were in violation of the "spirit and letter" of the document on basic principles of relations signed by Brezhnev and Nixon in May last year.

Moscow has suggested that the opponents of MFN are actually after larger game. Boris Svetlov, in a survey of U.S.-Soviet relations in the February issue of MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN, suggested that, having failed in an attempt to block the ratification of the SALT agreements last summer, the opponents of U.S.-Soviet normalization have seized upon the trade issue for another attempt.

In rebuttal to such attitudes, recent commentaries have uniformly cited the "great interest among U.S. business circles" in increased trade and economic relations and have cited business and Administration spokesmen to counter claims that the Soviet export potential is limited and that Moscow is more in need of the expansion of relations than is Washington. The Moscow central press carried prominently on page one the 15 February TASS report of Brezhnev's meeting with Dr. Armand Hammer in which "it was emphasized that the Soviet Union is a consistent advocate of development of trade and other economic ties with the United States." The theme was reiterated in Zhukov's 27 February PRAVDA article, which noted the mounting pressure by American businessmen for congressional approval of the trade agreement.

The comment has singled out the potential for export of Soviet gas and oil to the United States. Osipov's article in IZVESTIYA on 17 February, stressing the increasingly global dimensions of economic and social problems and the international cooperation thus needed in their solution, cited reports of the large fuel imports that will be necessary for U.S. domestic consumption in future

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years. In emphasizing the imperatives of global solutions and outlining their potentialities, Osipov caustically observed: "Only politicians who cannot see beyond their own noses, not to mention the future, can ignore these new circumstances."

Though the earlier voluminous Soviet comment on the dollar devaluation and attendant monetary crisis had failed to broach the issue of their implications for U.S.-Soviet trade, the 24 February Mayevskiy article in PRAVDA noted that in the wake of such difficulties the United States is now "discovering" the USSR. Even more explicitly, in the December 1972 issue of USA magazine, US Institute member Yevgeniy Shershnev had cited "acknowledgments" in Congress and elsewhere "that under present conditions the market of the socialist countries was becoming the only potential market for any kind of substantial expansion of American exports." In plugging the benefits of increased East-West trade, a 23 February PRAVDA commentary by Igor Biryukov went out of its way to refute allegations in the Italian press that Moscow was "gloating" over the U.S. monetary crisis and had greeted the run on the dollar with "ill-disguised satisfaction."

Soviet concern over China's potential as an alternative market for expanded U.S. trade was reflected in the 25 February domestic service commentators' roundtable which took considerable pains to document the "poor prospects" for U.S.-PRC trade. Moscow radio observer Leonid Zavyalov cited as evidence the fact that earlier reports on the establishment of trade missions in the two countries were belied by the announcement in the U.S.-PRC communique on Kissinger's visit that the missions were "relegated to the rank of liaison office."

ARMED FORCES
ANNIVERSARY

The impact on U.S.-Soviet relations of the May summit and the Vietnam cease-fire agreement was reflected in articles commemorating the 55th anniversary of the Soviet army and navy. Top military spokesmen, while warning of a continued threat from imperialism, portrayed a considerably improved international climate as compared with a year ago. Favorable developments in Europe as well as in U.S.-Soviet relations were singled out, but the change in the treatment of the United States was most apparent.

Last year, Defense Minister Grechko, in a PRAVDA article on the 23d, complained of the "complex" international situation and emphasized the presence of aggressive forces "headed by American imperialism" that were "hatching plans to destroy the Soviet Union."

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Marshal Yakubovskiy, First Deputy Defense Minister and Warsaw Pact commander, likewise focused in a TASS interview on the "enormous" U.S. military potential, singling out defense expenditures and forces overseas.

This year, neither Grechko in his 23 February PRAVDA article nor the TASS interview on the occasion--by General Pavlovskiy, commander-in-chief of the ground forces--mentioned the United States or any direct threat to Soviet security. In a rare reference to the SALT I agreements by a military spokesman, First Deputy Defense Minister Sergey Sokolov in a press conference reported by TASS on 20 February emphasized that the agreements signed in May had "facilitated an improvement of the political climate."

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U. S. - U. K. - SALT

MOSCOW HINTS UK ACQUISITION OF POSEIDON WOULD OBSTRUCT SALT

Moscow has conveyed concern over reports that London has asked Washington for the Poseidon missile complex to update its current nuclear deterrent force of Polaris submarines. Following the talks at the beginning of February between Prime Minister Heath and President Nixon and the subsequent debate in the British press over whether Heath had asked the President for the Poseidon missile, a PRAVDA commentary suggested that delivery of the Poseidon to the British would create obstacles to the strategic arms limitation talks. Soviet media, in discussing Britain's efforts to improve its nuclear forces and allegedly to create a "European nuclear deterrent," have continued to depict the Conservative government as the main opponent of detente in Europe.

SOVIET REACTION In PRAVDA on 15 February, the paper's London correspondent G. Vasilyev indirectly linked the British acquisition of Poseidon to the SALT negotiations by citing a Laborite MP's statement in Parliament. He quoted the MP as declaring that replacement of the British Polaris with the Poseidon "would create obstacles on the path of further progress in the vitally important talks on strategic arms limitation" and as inquiring whether "it would not instead be wiser gradually to liquidate our nuclear bases and missiles, which make the country so vulnerable in the event of war." Vasilyev observed that although the inquiry was couched "in the rhetorical form of a parliamentary question," it "unequivocally" expressed the MP's attitude toward "the Tories' new nuclear aspirations."

A RED STAR article on the 18th by Markov and Ponomarev also commented on the nuclear aspects of the Heath visit, with hints at ominous implications of Britain's "nuclear ambitions." Although the article did not explicitly mention SALT II, it pointedly noted the importance of the Poseidon: "The Poseidon is a new and more powerful ballistic missile developed in the United States. It has greater accuracy in hitting targets at the same range and has a multiple warhead which considerably increased its potential in neutralizing antimissile defense." It went on to charge that London's "nuclear ambitions are clearly in conflict with the spirit and demands of the times" and "are bound to cause bewilderment in connection with the consultations now under way in Helsinki and Vienna."

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Moscow media, in this connection, did not report British Defense Minister Carrington's statement, at a press conference on the 21st, indicating that Britain was satisfied with its current nuclear deterrent. He was quoted in the Western press as saying, "I am absolutely satisfied at present that the nuclear deterrent we have is effective and credible." Carrington's comments were elicited by the press on the day London released its white paper on the proposed defense budget, a paper Moscow media have castigated for alleging that the Soviet Union is "threatening" to swallow up the countries of West Europe.

Although British weapons systems are not covered by the SALT I agreements, Soviet SALT delegation head Semenov, in a "unilateral statement" made in Helsinki on 17 May 1972, declared that the Soviet Union considered the Interim Agreement on offensive weapons to include the combined total of modern ballistic missile submarines "presently in the possession not only of the United States but also of its NATO allies." Semenov said that if the U.S. allies in NATO increased the number of their modern submarines beyond the numerical level in operation or under construction at the time of the signing of the Interim Agreement, "the Soviet Union will have the right to a corresponding increase in the number of its submarines." In addition, Semenov said the Soviet Union considers that the Interim Agreement "only partially compensates for the strategic imbalance in the deployment of the nuclear-powered missile submarines of the USSR and the United States"--an "imbalance" which RED STAR implied would be further upset by qualitative improvements in London's nuclear arsenal.

"EUROPEAN" NUCLEAR
DETERRENT

Where much of the followup comment on Heath's visit to Washington merely touched on the possibility of London's forming a "European" nuclear force either within NATO or with France separately, the issue was discussed in detail in the February issue of the journal MIROVAYA EKONOMIKA I MEZHDUNARODYYE OTNOSHENIYA. The author of the article, Yuriy Tribitsov, examined London's attempts to create a "so-called West European deterrent," citing a frequently quoted statement by Carrington in the fall of 1972 that "the evolution of European defense must incorporate some form of European nuclear forces."

In reviewing the concept of a "combined Anglo-French nuclear force," Tribitsov pointed out that in the sixties the Tories reasoned that such a force would help overcome de Gaulle's

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opposition to British entry into the Common Market. Following London's entry into "Little Europe," the author wrote, the Conservatives used as their rationale for such a force "the unreliability of American guarantees to 'defend Europe' and--this is the main point--the military-political unification of the Common Market countries which will inevitably follow their economic unification." Tribitsov described the differences between the two approaches as "national" on the one hand and "European" on the other.

After suggesting that London still wants to retain its "special relationship" with Washington and is thus striving to establish the "European" force within the structure of NATO, Tribitsov recalled France's "well known" position that there can be no "restriction of its nuclear independence" and no form of NATO control over the French nuclear force. Citing a statement by President Pompidou in 1972 on the independence of the French nuclear force, Tribitsov said "the French President made it clearly understood that he considers the British proposal of nuclear partnership unacceptable while Britain remains an active member of the NATO military organization."

West Germany, according to Tribitsov, objected to the British plan on grounds that were the exact opposite of those adduced in Paris--that is, that it would tend "to undermine to some degree the American 'presence' in Europe." Asserting that the West German proponents of a West European nuclear force were defeated in the November 1972 FRG parliamentary elections, he observed that leaders of the Brandt-Scheel coalition, "while they champion economic and political rapprochement between the West European countries as well as wider cooperation between them on military questions," at the same time "genuflect in the direction of the American 'nuclear cover' and are trying to prevent any action by West Europe as a whole which may weaken the U.S. determination to 'defend' West Europe."

As for Washington, Tribitsov declared that "American officials prefer not to discuss the problem of 'European' nuclear forces openly, but press organs close to the U.S. top ruling circles do not conceal their suspicion of London's plan." He added that Washington does not want to do anything that would "entail the further impairment of NATO, whereas this is precisely what London is unable to guarantee."

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Winding up his review of the "contradictions" among the Western governments on the issue of forming a West European nuclear group, Tribitsov cautioned that "it would be wrong, nevertheless, to underestimate the potential of the British 'initiative'" and that "in any event, further pressing of the plan for 'European' nuclear forces may lead to an exacerbation of international relations."

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SINO-U.S. RELATIONS

PEKING TAKES RELAXED VIEW OF AMERICAN ROLE IN ASIA

The accelerated momentum in Sino-U.S. relations registered in the 22 February communique on Dr. Kissinger's 15-19 February visit to China has come in a period in which Peking has welcomed the Vietnam and Laos agreements as conducive to detente in Asia while putting the Korea question high on the agenda of outstanding issues. Consistent with its increasingly clear willingness to accept a continuing American presence in East Asia in the terms of the Nixon Doctrine, Peking has largely avoided criticism of such instruments of the U.S. presence as the mutual security treaty with Japan, SEATO and the network of U.S. bases along China's flanks, and other former targets of Chinese denunciation. At the same time, Peking has taken a relaxed posture toward Taiwan, making a pitch to nationalistic sentiment on the island while pointedly citing President Nixon's trip to Peking as a sign of the new times.

Promptly capitalizing on the improved atmosphere produced by the Vietnam accord, Peking was extraordinarily forthcoming in its treatment of Kissinger's latest visit. Most notably, Peking's highest sanction was conveyed by Mao's meeting with Kissinger, an honor that in the recent past has been accorded only to heads of state or government and foreign ministers. The point was brought further home in NCNA's account of the "frank and wide-ranging conversation in an unconstrained atmosphere," in which Mao asked Kissinger to "convey his regards to President Nixon." In a previous meeting between Mao and a visitor not of high government rank, Peking had chosen Christmas Day 1970 to disseminate a report on Mao's meeting "recently" with Edgar Snow and to publish belatedly a frontpage picture of Mao and Snow at the 1 October celebrations.

The 9-14 February visit to China of North Korean Foreign Minister Ho Tam immediately prior to the Kissinger visit occasioned authoritative comment putting Peking on record as favoring progress on Korea as an international question in the wake of the Vietnam agreement. PRC Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei, terming the Korea question "one of the important factors causing tension in Asia," declared that it is "most urgent" that favorable conditions be created for peaceful reunification of Korea and called for the United States to withdraw its troops.

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However, Chi did not echo the wide-ranging demands of his North Korean counterpart, who called on the United States to withdraw from Korea, Indochina, Taiwan, Japan, and all other parts of Asia.

In warmly welcoming the Vietnam agreement, Peking has expressed relief that an encumbrance on Sino-U.S. relations has been removed, a reaction reflected in the statement in the communique on Kissinger's visit that "the time was appropriate" for accelerating the normalization of relations. Peking has been cautious about placing responsibility on the United States for alleged violations of the Paris agreement. In its most authoritative comment on the subject, a 15 February PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article seconding Vietnamese communist protests made only passing mention of a U.S. responsibility for "enjoining" Saigon to comply with the provisions of the agreement. A 23 February PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial hailing the signing of the Laos agreement urged the United States to observe the terms of the accord by withdrawing its military personnel and terminating all military activities in Laos.

Peking's first direct reference to a continuing U.S. involvement in Thailand since the signing of the Vietnam agreement appeared in a 14 February NCNA report on the U.S. announcement two days earlier to the effect that the headquarters of American air operations in Southeast Asia will be transferred from South Vietnam to Thailand. A 23 February NCNA account of a Philippine CP statement welcoming the Vietnam agreement quoted the statement as warning the Vietnamese to remain vigilant so long as the United States maintains military bases and troops in Indochina and "in neighboring countries like the Philippines, Thailand, and other Asian countries." However, Peking's replays of statements on the Vietnam agreement from other Maoist Southeast Asian parties have carefully sanitized criticism of the United States as well as of Southeast Asian governments. NCNA's report of a Thai CP congratulatory statement to the NLFSV deleted a passage that described the United States as "brutal, ferocious, extremely arrogant, and economically and militarily powerful" as well as one that called for a protracted Thai people's war to "drive out U.S. imperialists and overthrow the reactionary Thanom clique."

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TAIWAN Peking's carefully calibrated treatment of the U.S. role in Asia has been accompanied by a more relaxed and sophisticated propaganda effort toward the people on Taiwan in an attempt to capitalize on the PRC's improved international position as well as to stimulate a sense of Chinese national unity and patriotism. This effort has followed the lines established over the past year in inviting Chinese to visit the mainland and underscoring Peking's concern for the "compatriots" on Taiwan,* but in recent weeks the propaganda fare has been enriched by the use of spokesmen who enjoy greater credibility and respect on Taiwan, by more varied and attractive programming, and by attempts to achieve a greater impact on Taiwan from the breakthroughs in the PRC's relations with the United States and Japan.

An outstanding example of this enrichment was a talk by Chinese philosopher Feng Yu-lan that was beamed on 16 February to his "old friends on Taiwan" by the PLA Fukien Front radio on the occasion of Chinese New Year. Feng seemed particularly well chosen not only because he commands respect for his scholarly achievements but also because he has been criticized in the past for being too independent of the communist line. His avowals that he has prospered in the PRC thus represent a rebuttal of the ROC's claim to be the custodian of classical Chinese culture against communist depredations.

In his talk Feng played upon Peking's international advances in the past year, pointing out that President Nixon and Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka had visited Peking and had "formally recognized that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China." In a pitch to Chinese patriotism, Feng expressed confidence that his friends "as Chinese" welcomed Peking's rising stature, and he disclosed that prominent noncommunist scholar Liang Shu-ming had been "overjoyed" at the news of the PRC's seating at the United Nations in 1971.

Aiming at Taiwan intellectuals' sensibilities, Feng recited a poem he had written in 1970 after receiving a personal message of regards from Mao. The poem portrayed Feng's position as an aged noncommunist intellectual who found a home under communist

* Peking's treatment of the Taiwan question over the past year is discussed in the 10 January 1973 TRENDS, pages S 1-7.

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rule. Even a "rotten stump of a tree" like Feng-- and, by implication, intellectuals now on Taiwan--is capable of "putting forth green leaves" in China under the aegis of Mao and the CCP.

In addition to making a pitch to the intellectuals, PRC broadcasts to Taiwan have tailored appeals to ROC military officials. As a notable example, Chen Chi-hsien, the former chief of staff of the Nationalist armies in the later stages of the war against Japan and one who enjoyed a rare reputation at that time for competence and honesty, appealed to his old friends on Taiwan in a broadcast on 7 February to come to the mainland to see the many changes that have taken place. The Taiwan question figured in the 25 February memorial ceremony in Peking of another former Nationalist commander, Tseng Tse-sheng, who defected to the communists in October 1948. Speaking at the ceremony, a PRC vice defense minister declared that the grief over his death must be translated into strength in the interest of "the liberation of Taiwan." NCNA's account of the event noted that during his illness Tseng had "repeatedly expressed his hope that Taiwan would be liberated at an early date so as to realize the reunification of the motherland."

A 2 February NCNA report on the situation on Taiwan pegged to the Chinese New Year claimed that "many compatriots" there listen to the broadcasts from the mainland in order to learn about "the ever-growing new changes" in the socialist motherland. "Some were particularly moved," according to NCNA, "when they heard their relatives or friends on the air." NCNA also made a point of noting that there had been a keen demand for Hong Kong newspapers during President Nixon's visit to China. Most of the NCNA account was devoted to a portrayal of misery among the people under "the dark rule of the Chiang Kai-shek clique," with only a passing mention of a U.S.-owned plant where there had been cases of poisoning of workers.

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USSR-CZECHOSLOVAKIA

BREZHNEV VISIT HIGHLIGHTS ANNIVERSARY FESTIVITIES IN PRAGUE

Speeches by Husak and Brezhnev--the only top foreign party leader in attendance--highlighted the observance in Prague of the 25th anniversary of the 1948 communist takeover. Brezhnev refrained from explicit mention either of the August 1968 invasion or of Husak's consolidation of the post-invasion situation, but Husak made the expected formal observations in this regard, noting the importance of the "international assistance of our allies" in surmounting the crisis. TASS reported that the Soviet leader's talks with the CPCZ Presidium members and secretaries on the 23d were marked by "a warm and comradely atmosphere and demonstrated again a complete identity of views on all questions discussed."

BREZHNEV SPEECHES In his 23 February rally speech, carried in the Moscow domestic service in a live relay of the proceedings, Brezhnev confined himself to general tributes to the solidarity of the socialist community and to the CSSR's progress since February 1948. Noting briefly that hostile classes both inside and outside the country had hoped to stage an "anti-February," the Soviet leader said Czechoslovakia is today "one of the most advanced, economically developed countries" with a steadily growing influence in international affairs, thanks to the guidance "of the Communist Party" based on Marxism-Leninism and socialist internationalism. He went on to stress that the socialist community exemplifies the "close voluntary cohesion of sovereign, independent states in the name of socialism and communism, profound respect for each other, full equality, and fraternal mutual assistance." The community also embodies, he added, "unity in struggle against imperialism, firm rebuff to the policy of aggression."

His brief review of international issues included Europe and Vietnam but omitted any mention of the Middle East.

Brezhnev's award of an Order of Lenin to Husak on his 60th birthday was the latest in a series of such awards which had also been given in recent months to Bulgaria's Zhivkov, Hungary's Kadar, and Poland's Gierek, also on their 60th birth anniversaries. In keeping with the occasion, Brezhnev on 22 February paid tribute to Husak's long-standing "loyalty to communist ideals, staunchness and courage, and organizing talent," qualities which "manifested

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themselves in full measure when the party instructed Comrade Husak to head the Central Committee at a time difficult for the country." The Soviet leader acknowledged, as he had done in the past, that the situation in Czechoslovakia "has entered the normal channel," the party's leading role has been strengthened, and "the aftermaths of the big damage done to the country's economy by anti-socialist forces have been liquidated." Underscoring Husak's growing status as a full-fledged international communist leader, Brezhnev cited his "vigorous participation in all the matters of the international communist movement" and "sincere concern" for the unity of the socialist camp.

HUSAK SPEECHES In his speech at the 23 February public rally, Husak recalled the "counterrevolutionary designs" of the 1968 revisionists which, he said, ran counter to "the will and interest" of the Czechoslovak people "in whose minds and hearts the ideas of socialism and friendship with the Soviet Union had struck deep roots." He added that "with the international assistance of our allies," the loyal forces of the party and people "thwarted this counterrevolutionary onslaught." He referred, as Brezhnev did not, to his own accession to the party leadership in April 1969, by which "we repaired the damage done by disruption and returned our country to the road of socialist development."

Husak stressed that the presence of "Comrade Leonid Ilich Brezhnev" at the festivities was "a great honor for us, an expression of the deepest fraternal relations."

In presenting the Czechoslovak Order of the White Lion to Brezhnev at Prague Castle on the morning of the 23d, Husak recalled with "gratitude" the Soviet leader's "attitude" toward the Czechoslovak people, party, and state over the years and added that "I should like to use this occasion to thank you again for all the good you have done for our people and our state over a period of almost 30 years." He went on to pay tribute, in general terms, to Brezhnev's efforts to unify the world movement, exemplified in the 1969 Moscow international party conference, and in behalf of world peace.

**MESSAGES FROM
OTHER BLOC LEADERS**

CTK's review on the 24th of apparently innocuous messages from the leaders of other communist countries did not include one from Bulgaria's Zhivkov and Todorov, carried by BIA earlier that day, which cited among other things efforts of "the enemies

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of socialism to turn back the wheel of history" in the CSSR. CTK included the wires from the leaders of Poland, the GDR, Hungary, Romania, Mongolia, and Cuba, none of which mentioned the 1968 events.

RELATIONS WITH THE FRG

Husak dispensed with any detailed review of international issues in his speeches during Brezhnev's 22-24 February Prague visit and thus did not reiterate his 20 February statement that "the time is now ripe" to resume the stalled bilateral talks with West Germany looking toward a settlement on the basis of nullification of the 1938 Munich pact. Brezhnev, however, in his rally speech on the 23d, declared that "no vestiges of the fascist policy of diktat and violence should darken relations between European states" and that "it is from such a position that we approach the just demand of the Czechoslovak people that the so-called Munich agreement should be recognized as invalid and unlawful." He added: "This problem can and must be constructively settled." His formulation, except for the added appeal for settlement, was reiterated in the final communique on his visit, carried by TASS late on the 24th.

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CHINA

SHANGHAI FORMS COUNTRY'S FIRST NEW PROVINCIAL-LEVEL YCL BODY

In announcing the formation of Shanghai's Young Communist League (YCL) committee, the country's first new provincial-level committee, Peking has indicated authoritatively that the central leaders have reached basic agreement on policy guidelines for forming new YCL committees and will oversee the rebuilding of a tightly disciplined organization to funnel youthful energies toward goals set by the central party apparatus. The first word on the formation of the Shanghai committee came from the center in the form of a 22 February PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial accompanied by a Shanghai-dated dispatch, both disseminated by NCNA's domestic service. The Shanghai radio broadcast the dispatch in its morning newscast on the 22d. Having left coverage of earlier moves toward reconstructing the YCL to provincial media, Peking's release of the editorial represents its first policy statement on the YCL since the cultural revolution.

After briefly announcing the formation of the new Shanghai committee and noting that other such organs are in the offing from other provinces,* the editorial tersely acknowledged that young people during the cultural revolution had written a "new page in the history of the youth movement in our country" by forming Red Guard units and "spreading the raging flames of revolution throughout the country." While the editorial thus credited youths who participated in the rebel Red Guard student movement with making past contributions to the youth movement, it was made clear that Peking is seeking to rebuild the YCL around a core of new youth leaders who are not tied to smoldering cultural revolution disputes. Red Guard representatives, for example, attended the Shanghai congress only as observers without the right to vote, and it was carefully noted that most of the regular delegates at the congress were youths who had emerged since the cultural revolution. And of the delegates attending the congress, over one-half were elected to the new committee. New blood from after the cultural revolution dominated the composition of the new committee's standing committee: the first and second names listed

* Eight other provinces--Liaoning, Tsinghai, Shensi, Shantung, Kwangtung, Hupeh, Anhwei, and Shansi--have announced that preparations are underway for the formation of provincial YCL committees in the near future.

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are newcomers to the Shanghai power structure, with public appearances dating back only one or two years. The third-ranking secretary, a YCL cadre since 1964, appears to be the only veteran on the standing committee, the remaining four having made no previously known public appearances.

The freewheeling student rebel of the cultural revolution days would, in fact, be uncomfortable in the rebuilt YCL structure. The editorial's measured instructions called upon YCL organizations to "closely coordinate with the party's central tasks" and to "oppose both the tendency to disregard political background, class origins and principles and the tendency to arbitrarily raise standards." By opposing these tendencies, the editorial confidently predicted, "we can absorb young people who are qualified to be YCL members into the YCL promptly" and "select a number of young party members and outstanding YCL members to fill YCL leading posts at all levels." New members must, however, be admitted "very, very carefully."

In keeping with the moderate guidelines contained in the PEOPLE's DAILY editorial, Wang Hung-wen--a former worker who advanced in the power hierarchy during the cultural revolution and who now functions as Shanghai's chief when the Politburo duties of Chang Chun-chiao and Yao Wen-yuan take them to Peking--delivered the keynote address at the congress and called on party organizations at all levels in Shanghai to strengthen their leadership over youth work. It was specifically resolved that all YCL organizations must work "under the centralized leadership of the party" and in "close coordination with the central tasks of the party."

A joint WEN HUI PAO-LIBERATION DAILY editorial broadcast by the Shanghai radio on 23 February argued that local youths could best fulfill the tasks set forth by the recently concluded congress by "studying assiduously" and by being concerned about "important state and international affairs." While the editorial stressed the need for Shanghai youths to intensify their efforts "to acquire scientific and cultural knowledge," YCL units were also advised to give due consideration "to recreation, cultural, and sports activities for youths" so that they can "do well in study and work."

LIN'S DEVIATION TERMED RIGHTIST RATHER THAN ULTRALEFTIST

The continuing ideological campaign to discredit Lin Piao and his cohorts, the "swindlers like Liu Shao-chi," has undergone a change with the redesignation of the heretics as "ultrarightists" amid

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protestations that their deviations were ultraleftist only in form and not in substance. A few months ago Lin was regularly taken to task, with no apparent qualms, for having been an ultraleftist. In the absence of any accompanying changes in the specific charges aimed at Lin or of hints of policy shifts to the left, the possibility arises that the new line may be a part of a campaign to make cultural revolution activists feel more at home on the current political scene. Provincial media have been warning recently against "settling old accounts" from the cultural revolution, and there has been an increase in the number and fervency of statements praising the achievements of the cultural revolution.

While there was some movement to expose Lin as a actual ultrarightist in December--including a RED FLAG article on supporting "revolutionary new things" which, in the context of defending the educational revolution, noted that swindlers "have consistently been ultraright"--the tag of ultrarightist did not become widespread until early January. Two provinces in Politburo member Chen Hsi-lien's northeastern bailiwick appear to have taken the lead. A LIAONING DAILY editorial on 5 January stated that although the swindlers had at times "fanned up ultraleftist sentiments," their ultrarightist essence could be "easily perceived." A Kirin broadcast on 7 January noted that since the swindlers represented imperialism abroad and reactionaries at home, "we can see that the line of swindlers like Liu Shao-chi is an ultrarightist line." A 16 January editorial in the Canton SOUTHERN DAILY also pointed up the need to "see through disguises and come to see the true ultrarightist nature" of the swindlers.

More recent comment attacking the ultrarightist line has added little of substance to the charges against Lin. A 19 February Tibet broadcast noted that exposing the swindlers' ultraleftism as a facade shows that "we must therefore look at the substance through the phenomena." A Chekiang broadcast on the 26th, explaining how study of Marx's "Critique of the Gotha Program" unveiled the "extremely rightist" nature of the swindler, described Marx's method of quoting "the apparently fascinating and seemingly extremely leftist phrases and words of the Gotha program" and then pointing out that the words really just put a "good color" on an alliance with "absolutist and feudalist enemies."

The redesignation of Lin did not represent a total break from past practice; there were occasional references to Lin's rightist tendencies in PRC media even during the period when it was most

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fashionable to call him an ultraleftist. For example, a Peking radio broadcast on 14 October stated that the swindlers, discovering during the cultural revolution that the "masses resented right opportunism, cunningly incited ultraleft trends of thought. . . . To put it bluntly, swindlers like Liu Shao-chi employed means which were ultraleft in form to conceal their right counterrevolutionary essence." This October broadcast differed from more recent ones, however, in that it made no bones about the swindlers having subverted the cultural revolution for their own ends; it criticized cultural revolution anarchism and attacked a number of common cultural revolution slogans. An article appearing around the same time, in the CANTON DAILY of 19 October, went even further, implying that the swindlers' attempt to stage a "revolution against our previous revolution" was an attempt to restore the Kuomintang and struggle against the "old cadres who took part in the protracted revolutionary struggle" of the civil war. According to the article, the real Maoist cultural revolution was directed only against "the handful of capitalist roaders within the party." Such attacks on the excesses of the cultural revolution, which inevitably tarred most cultural revolution activists as Lin's dupes, were heard occasionally throughout last year. A 3 December Harbin broadcast even seemed to declare open season on cultural revolution activists by instructing comrades afraid "that they would be charged with attacking other people in retaliation" to consider that they are really attacking decadent thinking.

The past few weeks have witnessed a greater effort to point up the achievements of the cultural revolution, perhaps prompted by the revival in the New Year's Day editorial of Mao's statement that "the current great proletarian cultural revolution is absolutely necessary and most timely for consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat, preventing capitalist restoration, and building socialism." While recent articles do not present the cultural revolution as an unmixed blessing, they seem to take pains to cite cultural revolution achievements as well as pointing to sabotage by swindlers. Typifying this treatment of the cultural revolution was an article in RED FLAG No. 2 examining Mao's work "Introducing 'The Communist.'" The article praised the cultural revolution for saving many of those who had made mistakes and for exposing the swindlers, but it attacked one of the standard cultural revolution slogans, "touch off a revolution that touches people to their very souls." (The image of revolution touching people to their souls was used not only in the 16-point decision on the cultural revolution in August 1966, but even by Chou En-lai in one of his speeches to

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the Red Guards.) Similarly a Liaoning broadcast on 14 February pointed out the attempts made by swindlers to subvert the revolution, but it made a strong pitch to "defend and develop the rich achievements" of the cultural revolution. It attacked swindlers' criticisms concerning sending youths to the countryside and also defended "achievements made in the educational revolution, in the revolution in literature and art, and in struggle-criticism-transformation in other fields."

The directive that cadres now in power should not "settle accounts" with those who rose during the cultural revolution has been picked up in several provincial broadcasts in conjunction with the campaign to criticize the real enemies first, and only then to focus on rectification of cadres who may have made mistakes. For example, a Kwangsi broadcast on 27 January warned against veering from the main orientation "through being tangled up in old accounts in problems of right and wrong among the people." A Hunan broadcast on 7 February carried a similar warning that if "we get entangled in old accounts of history we will easily lose our orientation."

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